CVE-2024-43468: Microsoft Configuration Manager SQL Injection Exploitation
Detects exploitation attempts targeting CVE-2024-43468, a SQL injection vulnerability in Microsoft Configuration Manager (SCCM/ConfigMgr). This vulnerability allows unauthenticated attackers to execute arbitrary SQL commands against the ConfigMgr site database, potentially leading to remote code execution, credential theft, and lateral movement within the environment. Listed in CISA KEV indicating active exploitation in the wild.
Vulnerability Intelligence
KEV — Known ExploitedAffected Software
- Vendor
- Microsoft
- Product
- Configuration Manager
Weakness (CWE)
Timeline
- Disclosed
- February 12, 2026
References & Proof of Concept
CVSS
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
What is CVE-2024-43468 CVE-2024-43468: Microsoft Configuration Manager SQL Injection Exploitation?
CVE-2024-43468: Microsoft Configuration Manager SQL Injection Exploitation (CVE-2024-43468) maps to the Initial Access and Credential Access and Lateral Movement tactics — the adversary is trying to get into your network in MITRE ATT&CK.
This page provides production-ready detection logic for CVE-2024-43468: Microsoft Configuration Manager SQL Injection Exploitation, covering the data sources and telemetry it touches: DeviceNetworkEvents, DeviceProcessEvents, W3CIISLog, Event. The queries below are rated critical severity at medium confidence, and ship for 7 SIEM platforms — KQL, SPL, Elastic, QRadar, Sumo, YARA-L, LogScale.
MITRE ATT&CK
let configmgr_ports = dynamic([80, 443, 8530, 8531, 10123]);
let sql_injection_patterns = dynamic(['UNION SELECT', 'OR 1=1', 'DROP TABLE', 'EXEC xp_', 'CAST(0x', 'WAITFOR DELAY', 'BENCHMARK(', "' OR '", "1=1--", 'xp_cmdshell']);
let timeframe = 1h;
union
(
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(timeframe)
| where RemotePort in (configmgr_ports) or LocalPort in (configmgr_ports)
| where DeviceName contains "SCCM" or DeviceName contains "ConfigMgr" or DeviceName contains "SMS"
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort, LocalPort, InitiatingProcessFileName, ActionType
| extend AlertType = "ConfigMgr Network Activity"
),
(
DeviceProcessEvents
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(timeframe)
| where InitiatingProcessParentFileName in~ ("SMSvcHost.exe", "CcmExec.exe", "smsexec.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("sqlcmd.exe", "osql.exe", "cmd.exe", "powershell.exe", "wscript.exe", "cscript.exe")
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, AccountName
| extend AlertType = "Suspicious Child Process from ConfigMgr"
),
(
W3CIISLog
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(timeframe)
| where csUriStem contains "/SMS_" or csUriStem contains "/ccm_" or csUriStem contains "/AdminService"
| where (
csUriQuery has_any (sql_injection_patterns)
or csUriStem has_any (sql_injection_patterns)
or csMethod == "POST"
)
| where scStatus in (200, 500, 400)
| project TimeGenerated, cIP, csMethod, csUriStem, csUriQuery, scStatus, scBytes, csUserAgent
| extend AlertType = "Suspicious ConfigMgr HTTP Request"
),
(
Event
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(timeframe)
| where Source == "MSSQLSERVER" or Source == "MSSQL$MICROSOFT##SS"
| where EventID in (18456, 17882, 8601, 1205)
| extend AlertType = "SQL Server Error - Potential Injection"
| project TimeGenerated, Source, EventID, RenderedDescription, Computer, AlertType
)
| order by TimeGenerated desc Detects suspicious activity indicative of CVE-2024-43468 exploitation against Microsoft Configuration Manager by correlating IIS web logs for SQL injection patterns in ConfigMgr endpoints, suspicious child processes spawned from ConfigMgr services, and SQL Server error events.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives
- Legitimate SCCM administrative queries that contain SQL-like syntax in URI parameters during software deployment operations
- Vulnerability scanners or security assessment tools probing ConfigMgr endpoints as part of authorized penetration testing
- ConfigMgr health monitoring scripts that spawn cmd.exe or PowerShell to check service status
- SQL Server maintenance jobs or replication tasks generating error events during normal operation
- Load balancers or proxies performing health checks against ConfigMgr IIS endpoints
Sigma rule & cross-platform mapping
The detection logic for CVE-2024-43468: Microsoft Configuration Manager SQL Injection Exploitation (CVE-2024-43468) above is provided in a vendor-neutral
form so you can deploy it on any SIEM. The same logic is shipped here as native
KQL (Microsoft Sentinel / Defender), SPL (Splunk), Elastic (Elastic Security (EQL)), QRadar (IBM QRadar (AQL)), Sumo (Sumo Logic CSE), YARA-L (Google Chronicle / SecOps), LogScale (CrowdStrike LogScale (CQL)) queries. In Sigma terms, this detection targets the
following logsource:
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows Browse the community-maintained Sigma rules for this technique:
Platform-specific guides for CVE-2024-43468
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1ConfigMgr AdminService SQL Injection Probe
Expected signal: IIS W3C log entry showing the request to /AdminService/v1.0/Device with the encoded SQL payload in the query string. SQL Server error log should show a syntax error if the payload reaches the database layer.
- Test 2SCCM Service xp_cmdshell Execution Simulation via SQL
Expected signal: Windows Application Event Log: SQL Server events for sp_configure changes (EventID 15457). SQL Server error log: xp_cmdshell execution entry. Sysmon EventID 1: cmd.exe spawned with parent process sqlservr.exe executing the whoami/hostname/ipconfig commands.
- Test 3ConfigMgr Management Point Error Flood via Malformed Requests
Expected signal: IIS access log entries for each probed endpoint showing the SQL injection string in the query parameter. HTTP response codes (200, 400, 500) indicating which endpoints processed the request. Network flow records showing sequential HTTP connections from the attacker IP to port 80/443.
Response Playbook
Triage
- Identify the source IP(s) of the suspicious request and determine if they are internal (managed SCCM client), external, or known scanning infrastructure — external sources attempting ConfigMgr endpoints are high-priority indicators.
- Review IIS logs on the ConfigMgr site server for the timeframe around the alert, focusing on requests to /SMS_MP, /ccm_system, /AdminService, and /CCM_Incoming; look for anomalous status codes (500 errors after SQL syntax), unusual user agents, and sequential probing of multiple endpoints.
- Check SQL Server error logs (MSSQL\ERRORLOG) for corresponding SQL syntax errors, login failures, or xp_cmdshell execution attempts that correlate temporally with suspicious HTTP requests.
- Determine ConfigMgr version and patch level — verify whether KB5044278 or the relevant October 2024 security update has been applied; unpatched systems with internet-accessible management points are critical.
- Assess the scope of potential data access: the ConfigMgr site database contains device inventory, credentials used for network access accounts, software deployment configurations, and potentially domain-joined system details.
Containment
- If exploitation is confirmed or strongly suspected, immediately restrict network access to ConfigMgr management points and site servers at the firewall or network ACL level — block untrusted source IPs from reaching ports 80, 443, 8530, 8531, and 10123.
- Disable the ConfigMgr Network Access Account and any service accounts with SQL Server access identified in the site database until credentials can be rotated, as SQL injection may have exposed or enabled extraction of stored credentials.
- Apply emergency patch (KB5044278 / October 2024 CU) to all ConfigMgr site servers and management points immediately; if patching is not immediately possible, consider taking the management point offline until patched.
Evidence Collection
- Capture and preserve IIS log files from all ConfigMgr site servers and management points covering the suspected exploitation window — copy to read-only storage immediately to prevent rotation.
- Export SQL Server error logs, Windows Application event logs (focus on MSSQL source events 18456, 17882, 8601), and Windows Security event logs showing process creation and network connections from the ConfigMgr server for the relevant timeframe.
- Collect a memory image of the ConfigMgr site server process (SMSvcHost.exe, w3wp.exe IIS worker processes) if active exploitation is suspected, to capture any in-memory payloads or injected code before remediation.
Escalation Criteria
- ! Escalate immediately to incident response if any evidence of post-exploitation is identified: new administrator accounts created, scheduled tasks added, lateral movement from the ConfigMgr server, or xp_cmdshell execution in SQL Server logs.
- ! Escalate if the ConfigMgr database is confirmed to have been accessed or exfiltrated — the site database contains sensitive inventory data, collection membership, and potentially cleartext or recoverable credentials for the Network Access Account and push installation accounts.
Investigation Guide
Forensic Artifacts
- >
IIS access logs at %SystemDrive%\inetpub\logs\LogFiles\W3SVC* on ConfigMgr site servers — contain raw HTTP requests including any SQL injection payloads - >
SQL Server error log at the MSSQL instance data directory (default: C:\Program Files\Microsoft SQL Server\MSSQL*.MSSQLSERVER\MSSQL\Log\ERRORLOG) — records SQL errors triggered by injection attempts - >
Windows Security Event Log (Event ID 4688 with process creation auditing) showing cmd.exe or powershell.exe spawned by SMSvcHost.exe or w3wp.exe - >
ConfigMgr site control file and site component status — check for unauthorized site configuration changes that may indicate post-exploitation tampering - >
SQL Server audit logs if enabled — provide granular record of SQL statements executed, including injected commands
Tuning Guidance
This detection will generate false positives in environments with active SCCM software deployments, especially during patch Tuesdays or large-scale application rollouts. Tune by: (1) building an allowlist of known-good source IPs (SCCM clients, management consoles) and excluding them from IIS log alerts; (2) creating an allowlist of expected child processes for your SCCM task sequences and filtering ProcessRollup2 alerts against it; (3) correlating SQL Server errors with the specific SCCM site database name to exclude errors from other SQL instances on shared servers. For environments with external-facing management points, weight alerts from non-RFC1918 source IPs as higher confidence. Consider deploying a dedicated ConfigMgr management point honeypot with no legitimate clients to increase signal fidelity.
Hunting Queries
Hunt for anomalous HTTP error rates against ConfigMgr endpoints over the past 7 days — elevated 400/500 error rates from a single source IP suggest automated SQL injection probing or exploitation attempts
W3CIISLog
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(7d)
| where csUriStem contains "/SMS_" or csUriStem contains "/ccm_" or csUriStem contains "/AdminService"
| where scStatus >= 400
| summarize count() by csUriStem, scStatus, cIP, bin(TimeGenerated, 1h)
| where count_ > 10
| order by count_ desc index=* sourcetype=iis (cs_uri_stem="/SMS_*" OR cs_uri_stem="/ccm_*" OR cs_uri_stem="/AdminService*") status>=400 earliest=-7d | stats count by cs_uri_stem, status, c_ip, _time | where count > 10 | sort - count Hunt for post-exploitation activity by identifying any command execution tools or reconnaissance commands spawned as children of ConfigMgr or IIS worker processes over the past 7 days
DeviceProcessEvents
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(7d)
| where InitiatingProcessParentFileName in~ ("SMSvcHost.exe", "CcmExec.exe", "smsexec.exe", "w3wp.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("sqlcmd.exe", "osql.exe", "bcp.exe", "cmd.exe", "powershell.exe", "net.exe", "whoami.exe", "ipconfig.exe")
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName
| order by TimeGenerated desc index=* sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1 earliest=-7d | where match(ParentImage, "(?i)SMSvcHost\.exe|CcmExec\.exe|smsexec\.exe|w3wp\.exe") AND match(Image, "(?i)sqlcmd\.exe|osql\.exe|bcp\.exe|cmd\.exe|powershell\.exe|net\.exe|whoami\.exe") | table _time, Computer, User, Image, CommandLine, ParentImage | sort - _time Atomic Red Team Tests
Simulates an unauthenticated SQL injection probe against the ConfigMgr AdminService REST API endpoint, which is one of the attack surfaces for CVE-2024-43468. This test sends a crafted HTTP request with a SQL injection payload in a query parameter.
Command
# LAB ONLY - Run from attacker machine against isolated ConfigMgr lab instance
# Requires: Python3, requests library, ConfigMgr lab server IP
$TARGET = "http://CONFIGMGR-LAB-SERVER"
$PAYLOAD = "' UNION SELECT NULL,NULL,NULL--"
$ENCODED = [System.Web.HttpUtility]::UrlEncode($PAYLOAD)
Invoke-WebRequest -Uri "$TARGET/AdminService/v1.0/Device?`$filter=Name eq '$ENCODED'" -Method GET -UseBasicParsing -TimeoutSec 10 | Select-Object StatusCode, StatusDescription, Content Cleanup
No cleanup required — this is a read-only probe. Review IIS logs on the lab ConfigMgr server and delete test entries if needed. Expected Telemetry
IIS W3C log entry showing the request to /AdminService/v1.0/Device with the encoded SQL payload in the query string. SQL Server error log should show a syntax error if the payload reaches the database layer.
Expected Detection
KQL W3CIISLog alert fires on csUriStem matching /AdminService and csUriQuery matching UNION SELECT pattern. QRadar AQL and Splunk SPL rules should also trigger on the IIS log event.
Simulates post-exploitation command execution via SQL Server xp_cmdshell, which an attacker could achieve after successfully exploiting CVE-2024-43468 to gain SQL execution context. Run directly against the ConfigMgr site database SQL instance in a lab environment.
Command
# LAB ONLY - Run on ConfigMgr SQL Server lab instance with DBA access to simulate post-exploitation
# Step 1: Enable xp_cmdshell (attacker would do this via injection)
SqlCmd -S CONFIGMGR-LAB-SQL -Q "EXEC sp_configure 'show advanced options', 1; RECONFIGURE; EXEC sp_configure 'xp_cmdshell', 1; RECONFIGURE;"
# Step 2: Execute simulated attacker command
SqlCmd -S CONFIGMGR-LAB-SQL -Q "EXEC xp_cmdshell 'whoami && hostname && ipconfig /all'" Cleanup
# Disable xp_cmdshell after test
SqlCmd -S CONFIGMGR-LAB-SQL -Q "EXEC sp_configure 'xp_cmdshell', 0; RECONFIGURE; EXEC sp_configure 'show advanced options', 0; RECONFIGURE;" Expected Telemetry
Windows Application Event Log: SQL Server events for sp_configure changes (EventID 15457). SQL Server error log: xp_cmdshell execution entry. Sysmon EventID 1: cmd.exe spawned with parent process sqlservr.exe executing the whoami/hostname/ipconfig commands.
Expected Detection
Sysmon-based process creation alerts in all SIEM platforms should fire on cmd.exe spawned from sqlservr.exe. The KQL DeviceProcessEvents query and Splunk SPL Sysmon query should both generate alerts.
Simulates reconnaissance probing behavior by sending multiple malformed HTTP requests to ConfigMgr management point endpoints to enumerate which endpoints are accessible and trigger SQL errors, mimicking early-stage exploitation of CVE-2024-43468.
Command
# LAB ONLY - Run from Linux attacker VM against isolated ConfigMgr lab
TARGET="http://CONFIGMGR-LAB-SERVER"
ENDPOINTS=("/SMS_MP/.sms_aut?MPLIST" "/SMS_MP/.sms_aut?MPCERT" "/ccm_system/request" "/AdminService/v1.0/" "/CCM_Incoming")
for ep in "${ENDPOINTS[@]}"; do
echo "[*] Probing: $TARGET$ep"
curl -sk -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code} - $TARGET$ep\n" -H "Content-Type: application/json" "$TARGET$ep?id=' OR '1'='1"
sleep 1
done Cleanup
No cleanup required. Review and archive IIS logs on the lab server after the test. Expected Telemetry
IIS access log entries for each probed endpoint showing the SQL injection string in the query parameter. HTTP response codes (200, 400, 500) indicating which endpoints processed the request. Network flow records showing sequential HTTP connections from the attacker IP to port 80/443.
Expected Detection
Hunting query for anomalous 400/500 error rates against ConfigMgr endpoints should trigger. IIS-based KQL and SPL detection rules should fire on the URI patterns matching SQL injection strings across multiple endpoints from the same source IP.