Adobe Acrobat Use-After-Free Exploitation (CVE-2020-9715)
Detects exploitation of CVE-2020-9715, a use-after-free vulnerability in Adobe Acrobat that allows arbitrary code execution. This vulnerability is listed in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog and has been actively exploited in the wild. Attackers typically deliver malicious PDF documents that trigger memory corruption upon rendering, leading to code execution in the context of the Acrobat process.
Vulnerability Intelligence
KEV — Known ExploitedAffected Software
- Vendor
- Adobe
- Product
- Acrobat
Weakness (CWE)
Timeline
- Disclosed
- April 13, 2026
References & Proof of Concept
CVSS
What is CVE-2020-9715 Adobe Acrobat Use-After-Free Exploitation (CVE-2020-9715)?
Adobe Acrobat Use-After-Free Exploitation (CVE-2020-9715) (CVE-2020-9715) maps to the Initial Access and Execution and Defense Evasion tactics — the adversary is trying to get into your network in MITRE ATT&CK.
This page provides production-ready detection logic for Adobe Acrobat Use-After-Free Exploitation (CVE-2020-9715), covering the data sources and telemetry it touches: Microsoft Defender for Endpoint, Microsoft Sentinel. The queries below are rated critical severity at high confidence, and ship for 7 SIEM platforms — KQL, SPL, Elastic, QRadar, Sumo, YARA-L, LogScale.
MITRE ATT&CK
let AcrobatProcs = dynamic(["AcroRd32.exe", "Acrobat.exe", "AcroCEF.exe", "AcroNGL.exe"]);
let SuspChildProcs = dynamic(["cmd.exe", "powershell.exe", "wscript.exe", "cscript.exe", "mshta.exe", "rundll32.exe", "regsvr32.exe", "certutil.exe", "bitsadmin.exe", "msiexec.exe", "wmic.exe"]);
DeviceProcessEvents
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ (AcrobatProcs)
| where FileName in~ (SuspChildProcs)
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessParentFileName
| extend AlertDetail = strcat("Adobe Acrobat spawned suspicious child process: ", FileName)
| order by TimeGenerated desc Detects Adobe Acrobat spawning suspicious child processes consistent with use-after-free exploitation leading to code execution. Targets Microsoft Defender for Endpoint telemetry.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives
- Acrobat plugins or extensions that legitimately spawn helper processes
- IT automation tools that invoke Acrobat via command line and chain other processes
- Security scanning tools that open PDFs and inspect spawned processes
Sigma rule & cross-platform mapping
The detection logic for Adobe Acrobat Use-After-Free Exploitation (CVE-2020-9715) (CVE-2020-9715) above is provided in a vendor-neutral
form so you can deploy it on any SIEM. The same logic is shipped here as native
KQL (Microsoft Sentinel / Defender), SPL (Splunk), Elastic (Elastic Security (EQL)), QRadar (IBM QRadar (AQL)), Sumo (Sumo Logic CSE), YARA-L (Google Chronicle / SecOps), LogScale (CrowdStrike LogScale (CQL)) queries. In Sigma terms, this detection targets the
following logsource:
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows Browse the community-maintained Sigma rules for this technique:
Platform-specific guides for CVE-2020-9715
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 4 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1Simulate Acrobat UAF — Malicious PDF Spawning cmd.exe
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1 showing cmd.exe with ParentImage path containing AcroRd32; DeviceProcessEvents entry in MDE with InitiatingProcessFileName = AcroRd32_sim.exe and FileName = cmd.exe
- Test 2Simulate Acrobat UAF — PowerShell Payload Execution
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1 for powershell.exe with suspicious parent; DeviceProcessEvents capturing PowerShell command-line with -ExecutionPolicy Bypass flag
- Test 3Simulate Acrobat UAF — Executable Drop to Temp Directory
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 11 (FileCreate) for executable written to %TEMP%; Sysmon Event ID 1 for process launch from %TEMP% path; MDE DeviceFileEvents and DeviceProcessEvents entries
- Test 4Simulate Acrobat UAF — Outbound C2 Beacon Simulation
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 3 (NetworkConnect) for outbound connection to non-RFC1918 IP on non-standard port; DeviceNetworkEvents in MDE capturing the destination IP and port
Unlock Pro Content
Get the full detection package for CVE-2020-9715 including response playbook, investigation guide, and atomic red team tests.