CVE-2010-0806 Microsoft Internet Explorer Use-After-Free Exploitation
Detects exploitation of CVE-2010-0806, a use-after-free vulnerability in Microsoft Internet Explorer. This vulnerability allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted web page. It is listed in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog and has been actively exploited in the wild.
Vulnerability Intelligence
KEV — Known ExploitedAffected Software
- Vendor
- Microsoft
- Product
- Internet Explorer
Weakness (CWE)
Timeline
- Disclosed
- May 20, 2026
CVSS
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
What is CVE-2010-0806 CVE-2010-0806 Microsoft Internet Explorer Use-After-Free Exploitation?
CVE-2010-0806 Microsoft Internet Explorer Use-After-Free Exploitation (CVE-2010-0806) maps to the Initial Access and Execution tactics — the adversary is trying to get into your network in MITRE ATT&CK.
This page provides production-ready detection logic for CVE-2010-0806 Microsoft Internet Explorer Use-After-Free Exploitation, covering the data sources and telemetry it touches: Microsoft Defender for Endpoint, Microsoft Sentinel, DeviceProcessEvents, DeviceNetworkEvents. The queries below are rated critical severity at medium confidence, and ship for 7 SIEM platforms — KQL, SPL, Elastic, QRadar, Sumo, YARA-L, LogScale.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Initial Access Execution
let suspiciousIEProcesses = DeviceProcessEvents
| where FileName =~ "iexplore.exe"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName !in~ ("explorer.exe", "iexplore.exe", "userinit.exe")
| project DeviceId, DeviceName, Timestamp, ProcessId, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, AccountName;
let ieSuspiciousChildren = DeviceProcessEvents
| where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "iexplore.exe"
| where FileName in~ ("cmd.exe", "powershell.exe", "wscript.exe", "cscript.exe", "mshta.exe", "regsvr32.exe", "rundll32.exe", "svchost.exe")
| project DeviceId, DeviceName, Timestamp, ProcessId, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessId, AccountName;
let ieNetworkAfterSpawn = DeviceNetworkEvents
| where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "iexplore.exe"
| where RemotePort in (80, 443, 8080, 4444, 1337)
| project DeviceId, DeviceName, Timestamp, RemoteIP, RemotePort, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine;
ieSuspiciousChildren
| union suspiciousIEProcesses
| union ieNetworkAfterSpawn
| summarize count() by DeviceId, DeviceName, FileName, InitiatingProcessFileName, bin(Timestamp, 5m)
| where count_ > 0
| order by count_ desc Detects suspicious Internet Explorer process behavior indicative of CVE-2010-0806 exploitation, including abnormal child process spawning and unusual network connections following IE execution.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives
- Legitimate IE automation tools or testing frameworks spawning child processes
- Enterprise software using IE as an embedded browser component
- Scripted deployments or administrative tools that invoke iexplore.exe programmatically
- Browser Helper Objects or extensions that spawn legitimate helper processes
Sigma rule & cross-platform mapping
The detection logic for CVE-2010-0806 Microsoft Internet Explorer Use-After-Free Exploitation (CVE-2010-0806) above is provided in a vendor-neutral
form so you can deploy it on any SIEM. The same logic is shipped here as native
KQL (Microsoft Sentinel / Defender), SPL (Splunk), Elastic (Elastic Security (EQL)), QRadar (IBM QRadar (AQL)), Sumo (Sumo Logic CSE), YARA-L (Google Chronicle / SecOps), LogScale (CrowdStrike LogScale (CQL)) queries. In Sigma terms, this detection targets the
following logsource:
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows Browse the community-maintained Sigma rules for this technique:
Platform-specific guides for CVE-2010-0806
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1Simulate IE Spawning CMD via Scripted Process Launch
Expected signal: ProcessCreate event with ParentImage=iexplore.exe and Image=cmd.exe visible in Sysmon Event ID 1 and Windows Security Event ID 4688
- Test 2Internet Explorer Spawning PowerShell for Encoded Command Execution
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: powershell.exe with encoded command and parent iexplore.exe; Network telemetry showing iexplore.exe with an active TCP session at time of child spawn
- Test 3Heap Spray Pattern Simulation via IE Memory Allocation Script
Expected signal: High memory allocation events in iexplore.exe process; potential script engine events logged if Script Block Logging is enabled; browser process memory consumption spike visible in performance telemetry
Response Playbook
Triage
- Identify the affected host and confirm the version of Internet Explorer running. Cross-reference against known vulnerable versions for CVE-2010-0806 (IE 6 and IE 7 primarily).
- Review process tree on the affected endpoint: identify whether iexplore.exe spawned unexpected child processes (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, wscript.exe, mshta.exe, etc.) and capture the full command-line arguments.
- Correlate the triggering event with web proxy or DNS logs to identify the source URL visited immediately before the anomalous process spawn. Determine if the URL is known-malicious or newly registered.
- Check for any network connections established by iexplore.exe or its child processes to external IPs during or after the suspicious activity window.
Containment
- Immediately isolate the affected host from the network via EDR remote isolation or VLAN quarantine to prevent lateral movement or C2 beacon activity.
- Terminate the iexplore.exe process and any suspicious child processes. If shellcode execution is suspected, consider taking a memory dump before termination for forensic analysis.
Evidence Collection
- Capture a full memory dump of the iexplore.exe process (and child processes if alive) using tools such as ProcDump or WinPmem. Preserve for shellcode and heap-spray artifact analysis.
- Collect Windows Event Logs (Security, System, Application), Sysmon logs, PowerShell transcript logs, and prefetch files from the affected host. Preserve browser cache, history, and temporary internet files from the IE profile directory.
Escalation Criteria
- ! Escalate immediately if the child process executed a reverse shell, downloaded additional payloads, or established a persistent foothold (scheduled tasks, registry run keys, service creation).
- ! Escalate if the affected host has access to sensitive systems, domain controllers, or stores privileged credentials — indicating potential for high-impact lateral movement following initial exploitation.
Investigation Guide
Forensic Artifacts
- >
Internet Explorer temporary internet files and cache located at %LOCALAPPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files — may contain the exploit page HTML/JavaScript - >
Windows prefetch files for iexplore.exe and any spawned child processes at C:\Windows\Prefetch\ - >
Registry key HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\TypedURLs for recently visited URLs - >
Memory forensics: heap spray patterns (large NOP sleds or repeated shellcode blocks) within the iexplore.exe process memory dump
Tuning Guidance
This detection will generate false positives in environments with legacy enterprise applications that use Internet Explorer's COM automation interfaces to invoke scripts or local executables. Baseline normal IE child process behavior per business unit before operationalizing. Consider adding allowlists for known-good parent-child pairs (e.g., iexplore.exe → specific vendor installer paths). Suppress alerts from known automated testing infrastructure. Raise confidence to HIGH if correlated with a known-malicious URL from threat intel feeds or if the child process command line contains encoded payloads, network callbacks, or persistence-related arguments.
Hunting Queries
Broad hunt for any process spawned by Internet Explorer across the environment, useful for identifying historically compromised hosts or persistent footholds established via CVE-2010-0806.
DeviceProcessEvents
| where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "iexplore.exe"
| where FileName in~ ("cmd.exe", "powershell.exe", "wscript.exe", "cscript.exe", "mshta.exe", "regsvr32.exe", "rundll32.exe", "svchost.exe", "notepad.exe")
| summarize count(), make_set(ProcessCommandLine), make_set(FileName) by DeviceId, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, AccountName, bin(Timestamp, 1h)
| where count_ >= 1
| order by count_ desc index=endpoint sourcetype=sysmon EventCode=1 ParentImage="*iexplore.exe*"
| stats count values(Image) as spawned_processes values(CommandLine) as commandlines by ComputerName, ParentImage, User
| where count >= 1
| sort - count Atomic Red Team Tests
Simulates the post-exploitation behavior of CVE-2010-0806 by launching cmd.exe as a child of iexplore.exe using WMI process creation, mimicking shellcode execution outcome.
Command
wmic process call create "cmd.exe /c whoami > C:\Temp\ie_test_output.txt" Cleanup
del C:\Temp\ie_test_output.txt Expected Telemetry
ProcessCreate event with ParentImage=iexplore.exe and Image=cmd.exe visible in Sysmon Event ID 1 and Windows Security Event ID 4688
Expected Detection
Alert triggered on iexplore.exe spawning cmd.exe with command-line arguments
Tests detection of IE spawning PowerShell with an encoded command, replicating a common post-exploitation pattern following heap spray and use-after-free exploitation.
Command
Start-Process -FilePath 'C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exe' -ArgumentList 'about:blank'; Start-Sleep -s 2; $ie = Get-Process iexplore | Select-Object -First 1; Start-Process powershell.exe -ArgumentList '-EncodedCommand', ([Convert]::ToBase64String([Text.Encoding]::Unicode.GetBytes('Write-Host CVE-2010-0806 Test'))) -WorkingDirectory 'C:\Windows\Temp' Cleanup
Stop-Process -Name iexplore -Force -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue; Stop-Process -Name powershell -Force -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue Expected Telemetry
Sysmon Event ID 1: powershell.exe with encoded command and parent iexplore.exe; Network telemetry showing iexplore.exe with an active TCP session at time of child spawn
Expected Detection
Alert on IE spawning PowerShell with encoded command-line arguments
Simulates the JavaScript heap spray technique commonly paired with CVE-2010-0806 by allocating large memory blocks in a controlled IE session. Lab use only.
Command
Set-Content -Path C:\Temp\heap_spray_test.html -Value '<html><body><script>var spray=[]; for(var i=0;i<1000;i++){spray.push(new Array(10000).join("A"));}document.write("Heap spray complete: "+spray.length+" blocks");</script></body></html>'; Start-Process 'C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exe' -ArgumentList 'C:\Temp\heap_spray_test.html' Cleanup
Stop-Process -Name iexplore -Force -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue; Remove-Item C:\Temp\heap_spray_test.html -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue Expected Telemetry
High memory allocation events in iexplore.exe process; potential script engine events logged if Script Block Logging is enabled; browser process memory consumption spike visible in performance telemetry
Expected Detection
Memory-based behavioral detections or anomaly alerts for iexplore.exe memory consumption; script engine telemetry showing large repeated string allocations