CVE-2009-3459 Splunk · SPL

Detect Adobe Acrobat and Reader Heap-Based Buffer Overflow (CVE-2009-3459) in Splunk

Detects exploitation of a heap-based buffer overflow vulnerability in Adobe Acrobat and Reader (CVE-2009-3459). This CISA KEV vulnerability allows attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted PDF file. Exploitation typically results in AcroRd32.exe or Acrobat.exe spawning unexpected child processes, making unusual network connections, or writing executable payloads to disk.

MITRE ATT&CK

Tactic
Initial Access Execution Defense Evasion

SPL Detection Query

Splunk (SPL)
spl
index=* sourcetype IN ("WinEventLog:Security", "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", "crowdstrike:events:sensor")
| eval parent_proc=coalesce(ParentImage, parent_process_name, ParentProcessName)
| eval child_proc=coalesce(Image, process_name, NewProcessName)
| where match(parent_proc, "(?i)(AcroRd32\.exe|Acrobat\.exe|AcroBroker\.exe)")
| eval suspicious_child=if(match(child_proc, "(?i)(cmd\.exe|powershell\.exe|wscript\.exe|cscript\.exe|mshta\.exe|rundll32\.exe|regsvr32\.exe)"), 1, 0)
| eval network_event=if(sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" AND EventCode=3, 1, 0)
| eval file_drop=if(sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" AND EventCode=11 AND match(TargetFilename, "(?i)\.(exe|dll|bat|ps1|vbs)$") AND match(TargetFilename, "(?i)(temp|appdata|public|downloads)"), 1, 0)
| where suspicious_child=1 OR network_event=1 OR file_drop=1
| eval detection_reason=case(suspicious_child=1, "Adobe Reader spawned suspicious child", file_drop=1, "Adobe Reader dropped executable", network_event=1, "Adobe Reader made network connection", true(), "Unknown")
| table _time, host, user, parent_proc, child_proc, CommandLine, detection_reason
| sort -_time
critical severity high confidence

Detects exploitation indicators from CVE-2009-3459: Adobe Reader/Acrobat spawning shell interpreters, dropping executables, or initiating network connections via Sysmon and Windows Security event logs.

Data Sources

SysmonWindows Security Event LogCrowdStrike Falcon

Required Sourcetypes

XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/OperationalWinEventLog:Securitycrowdstrike:events:sensor

False Positives & Tuning

  • Legitimate Adobe Acrobat Pro features that invoke command-line tools for PDF processing
  • Enterprise document management systems using Adobe Reader as a rendering backend
  • Automated testing pipelines that open PDFs and post-process output

Other platforms for CVE-2009-3459


Testing Methodology

Validate this detection against 4 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.

  1. Test 1Simulate Adobe Reader Spawning cmd.exe

    Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: process creation with ParentImage matching AcroRd32.exe and Image matching cmd.exe; DeviceProcessEvents in Defender with InitiatingProcessFileName=AcroRd32.exe and FileName=cmd.exe.

  2. Test 2Simulate Adobe Reader Writing Executable to Temp

    Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 11: TargetFilename=C:\Temp\payload.exe, Image matching AcroRd32.exe; DeviceFileEvents in Defender with InitiatingProcessFileName=AcroRd32.exe and FileName=payload.exe.

  3. Test 3Simulate Adobe Reader Making Outbound Network Connection

    Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 3: Image matching AcroRd32.exe, DestinationIp=93.184.216.34, DestinationPort=80; DeviceNetworkEvents in Defender with InitiatingProcessFileName=AcroRd32.exe and non-RFC1918 RemoteIP.

  4. Test 4Open Malicious PDF in Sandboxed Adobe Reader (Lab Only)

    Expected signal: Heap spray artifacts in AcroRd32.exe memory; child process creation events; potential shellcode execution visible in memory forensics; network connection attempt if payload is weaponized.

Unlock Pro Content

Get the full detection package for CVE-2009-3459 including response playbook, investigation guide, and atomic red team tests.

Response PlaybookInvestigation GuideHunting QueriesAtomic Red Team TestsTuning Guidance

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