CVE-2008-4250 IBM QRadar · QRadar

Detect MS08-067 NetAPI Buffer Overflow Exploitation Attempt (CVE-2008-4250) in IBM QRadar

CVE-2008-4250 is a critical buffer overflow vulnerability in the Windows Server service (netapi32.dll) affecting Microsoft Windows XP, 2000, 2003, Vista, and Server 2008. Exploitation via a specially crafted RPC request to the NetpwPathCanonicalize function allows unauthenticated remote code execution as SYSTEM. This vulnerability was exploited by the Conficker worm and remains listed in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog. Detection focuses on suspicious SMB/RPC activity, NetAPI service anomalies, and post-exploitation indicators including lateral movement and payload staging.

MITRE ATT&CK

Tactic
Initial Access Lateral Movement Privilege Escalation

QRadar Detection Query

IBM QRadar (QRadar)
sql
SELECT
  DATEFORMAT(starttime, 'YYYY-MM-dd HH:mm:ss') AS event_time,
  sourceip,
  destinationip,
  destinationport,
  username,
  QIDNAME(qid) AS event_name,
  category,
  logsourcename(logsourceid) AS log_source,
  COUNT(*) AS event_count
FROM events
WHERE
  LOGSOURCETYPENAME(devicetype) IN ('Microsoft Windows Security Event Log', 'Microsoft Windows Event Log')
  AND (
    (eventid IN (4624, 4625) AND "Logon Type" = '3' AND sourceip IS NOT NULL AND sourceip != '127.0.0.1')
    OR
    (eventid = 4688 AND "New Process Name" LIKE '%cmd.exe' AND "Creator Process Name" LIKE '%svchost.exe')
    OR
    (eventid = 7045)
  )
  AND starttime > NOW() - 3600000
GROUP BY
  sourceip, destinationip, destinationport, username, qid, category, logsourceid
HAVING
  (eventid IN (4624, 4625) AND event_count > 20)
  OR eventid IN (4688, 7045)
ORDER BY event_time DESC
LIMIT 1000
critical severity medium confidence

QRadar AQL query detecting MS08-067 exploitation patterns including high-volume SMB network logon failures, suspicious cmd.exe processes spawned by svchost, and unexpected service installations that may indicate Conficker or similar worm activity.

Data Sources

Windows Security Event LogWindows System Event Log

Required Tables

events

False Positives & Tuning

  • Enterprise software deployment systems generating high volumes of network logon events
  • Scripted administrative tasks that invoke cmd.exe through Windows services
  • Legitimate service installations during scheduled maintenance windows

Other platforms for CVE-2008-4250


Testing Methodology

Validate this detection against 4 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.

  1. Test 1MS08-067 Exploitation via Metasploit (Isolated Lab)

    Expected signal: Inbound TCP connection to port 445 on target from attacker IP; svchost.exe spawning cmd.exe or a shell process; network connection back to attacker on port 4444; Windows Security Event 4624 (logon type 3) from attacker IP

  2. Test 2Conficker-Style SMB Scanning Simulation

    Expected signal: High-volume TCP SYN packets to ports 445, 139, and 135 across multiple destination IPs; network flow logs showing >30 connections from single source within 5 minutes; IDS/firewall alerts for port scan activity

  3. Test 3Post-Exploitation Service Installation (Conficker Persistence Simulation)

    Expected signal: Windows System Event ID 7045 (new service installed); Windows Security Event ID 4697 (service installed); Sysmon Event ID 12/13 registry modifications under HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services

  4. Test 4Lateral Movement via PsExec over SMB (Post-Exploitation Simulation)

    Expected signal: TCP connection to port 445 on target; Windows Security Event 4624 (logon type 3) on target; PSEXESVC service installation Event ID 7045 on target; cmd.exe execution on target host under SYSTEM or Administrator context

Unlock Pro Content

Get the full detection package for CVE-2008-4250 including response playbook, investigation guide, and atomic red team tests.

Response PlaybookInvestigation GuideHunting QueriesAtomic Red Team TestsTuning Guidance

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