title: Impersonation (T1656)
id: df00tech-t1656
status: experimental
description: "This detection identifies adversary impersonation activity targeting organizational users through email-based business email compromise (BEC), help desk social engineering, and lookalike sender patterns. The detection focuses on emails with authentication failures (SPF/DKIM/DMARC) combined with high-urgency subject language, display name spoofing where sender display names match internal user identities but originate from external domains, and abnormal SendAs or SendOnBehalf delegation activity. Coverage extends to AAD sign-in anomalies that may indicate successful credential theft following impersonation-based help desk attacks, as seen in LAPSUS$ and Storm-1811 campaigns."
references:
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1656/
  - https://df00tech.com/detections/T1656
author: df00tech
date: 2026/03/20
tags:
  - attack.t1656
# NOTE: logsource is auto-derived and may need adjustment for your environment
logsource:
  product: azure
detection:
  # This detection logic could not be auto-translated; see the KQL/SPL query on df00tech.
  selection:
    EventID: '*'
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - "Legitimate third-party email service providers (Mailchimp, Salesforce, HubSpot) frequently fail DMARC when not properly configured in the sending domain's DNS, generating high-urgency transactional emails (payment confirmations, invoice delivery)"
  - Executive assistants or shared mailbox operators legitimately using SendAs or SendOnBehalf delegation on behalf of their principals will trigger the delegation abuse branch — validate by checking O365 delegation configuration in Exchange
  - Vendors or contractors whose display names match internal employees with the same name (common surnames) will trigger DisplayNameSpoof detection — correlate with known vendor contact lists and verify recipient context
level: high
