Search Threat Vendor Data
Detects adversary reconnaissance activity where threat actors query threat intelligence vendor services — such as VirusTotal, Shodan, Recorded Future, AlienVault OTX, or GreyNoise — to monitor whether their own infrastructure, malware samples, or campaign indicators have been detected and published. Since this technique primarily occurs outside the victim network, detections are indirect and focus on observable side effects: suspicious outbound connections to threat intel APIs from hosts with no legitimate business reason, correlation of known malicious IP indicators making threat intel queries visible through egress proxy logs, and rapid indicator rotation patterns following public threat intel disclosures. Adversaries have been documented replacing flagged indicators within days of publication, making behavioral correlation between threat intel release timestamps and infrastructure changes a secondary hunting signal.
What is T1681 Search Threat Vendor Data?
Search Threat Vendor Data (T1681) maps to the Reconnaissance tactic — the adversary is trying to gather information they can use to plan future operations in MITRE ATT&CK.
This page provides production-ready detection logic for Search Threat Vendor Data, covering the data sources and telemetry it touches: Microsoft Sentinel, Network Proxy / Firewall (CEF format), Microsoft Defender Threat Intelligence. The queries below are rated medium severity at low confidence, and ship for 7 SIEM platforms — KQL, SPL, Elastic, QRadar, Sumo, YARA-L, LogScale.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Reconnaissance
- Technique
- T1681 Search Threat Vendor Data
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1681/
let ThreatIntelAPIs = dynamic([
"virustotal.com", "api.virustotal.com",
"api.shodan.io", "shodan.io",
"api.recordedfuture.com", "app.recordedfuture.com",
"api.greynoise.io", "viz.greynoise.io",
"otx.alienvault.com",
"urlscan.io", "urlscan.io",
"malwarebazaar.abuse.ch", "bazaar.abuse.ch",
"threatfox.abuse.ch",
"mb-api.abuse.ch",
"pulsedive.com",
"api.threatminer.org",
"www.hybrid-analysis.com", "api.hybrid-analysis.com",
"tria.ge", "api.tria.ge",
"any.run"
]);
let KnownSOCAccounts = dynamic(["svc-threathunting", "svc-siem", "soc-analyst", "siem-collector"]);
CommonSecurityLog
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where isnotempty(RequestURL)
| extend AccessedDomain = tolower(extract(@"(?:https?://)?([^/:?#\\s]+)", 1, RequestURL))
| where AccessedDomain has_any (ThreatIntelAPIs)
| where SourceUserName !in~ (KnownSOCAccounts)
| where DeviceAction !in ("block", "deny", "drop")
| summarize
QueryCount = count(),
UniqueURLs = dcount(RequestURL),
SampledURLs = make_set(RequestURL, 10),
UserAccounts = make_set(SourceUserName, 10),
BytesOut = sum(SentBytes),
FirstSeen = min(TimeGenerated),
LastSeen = max(TimeGenerated)
by SourceIP, AccessedDomain
| join kind=leftouter (
ThreatIntelligenceIndicator
| where TimeGenerated > ago(30d)
| where IsActive == true
| where IndicatorType == "networkip"
| summarize ThreatScore = max(ConfidenceScore), ThreatTypes = make_set(ThreatType, 5) by NetworkIP
) on $left.SourceIP == $right.NetworkIP
| extend RiskFlag = case(
isnotempty(ThreatScore) and ThreatScore > 70, "KnownMaliciousSource",
QueryCount > 100 and array_length(UserAccounts) == 1, "HighVolumeNonSOC",
UniqueURLs > 20, "BroadRecon",
"Low"
)
| where RiskFlag != "Low"
| project FirstSeen, LastSeen, SourceIP, AccessedDomain, QueryCount, UniqueURLs, SampledURLs, UserAccounts, ThreatScore, ThreatTypes, RiskFlag
| sort by ThreatScore desc, QueryCount desc Monitors proxy and firewall logs (CommonSecurityLog) for outbound connections from internal hosts to known threat intelligence vendor APIs and platforms. Correlates source IPs against the ThreatIntelligenceIndicator table to flag when hosts with existing threat intelligence hits are querying these services — a pattern consistent with adversaries checking if their infrastructure has been detected and reported. Also flags high-volume, non-SOC queries suggesting automated reconnaissance.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives
- Security Operations Center analysts performing daily threat hunting or indicator enrichment via threat intel APIs
- Automated SOAR playbooks or SIEM enrichment workflows querying VirusTotal or similar platforms to enrich alerts
- Vulnerability management or penetration testing tools performing infrastructure fingerprinting via Shodan
- Security researchers and threat intelligence teams conducting legitimate campaign analysis
- Endpoint protection platforms that perform cloud-based file reputation lookups through proxy-visible connections
Sigma rule & cross-platform mapping
The detection logic for Search Threat Vendor Data (T1681) above is provided in a vendor-neutral
form so you can deploy it on any SIEM. The same logic is shipped here as native
KQL (Microsoft Sentinel / Defender), SPL (Splunk), Elastic (Elastic Security (EQL)), QRadar (IBM QRadar (AQL)), Sumo (Sumo Logic CSE), YARA-L (Google Chronicle / SecOps), LogScale (CrowdStrike LogScale (CQL)) queries. In Sigma terms, this detection targets the
following logsource:
logsource:
category: network_connection
product: windows Browse the community-maintained Sigma rules for this technique:
Platform-specific guides for T1681
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1VirusTotal API Indicator Self-Lookup via PowerShell
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 3 (Network Connection) showing powershell.exe connecting to www.virustotal.com:443. Proxy logs (CommonSecurityLog / squid) showing HTTPS CONNECT to www.virustotal.com with User-Agent indicating PowerShell Invoke-RestMethod. DNS query (Sysmon Event ID 22) for www.virustotal.com.
- Test 2Shodan Infrastructure Reconnaissance via Python Script
Expected signal: Linux auditd SYSCALL records for execve of python3 with the Shodan API script content. Network connection logs (firewall/proxy) showing outbound HTTPS to api.shodan.io:443 from the test host. DNS query log entry for api.shodan.io.
- Test 3Automated Multi-Vendor Threat Intel Sweep Simulating Adversary Self-Monitoring
Expected signal: Network/proxy logs showing sequential outbound HTTPS connections to urlscan.io, threatfox-api.abuse.ch (abuse.ch), and api.greynoise.io within a 30-second window from the same source IP. Auditd SYSCALL records for execve of curl (or bash executing the script). DNS queries for all three domains in rapid succession.
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