Device Driver Discovery

let DriverDiscoveryBinaries = dynamic(["driverquery.exe", "lsmod", "modinfo"]);
let DriverDiscoveryKeywords = dynamic(["driverquery", "lsmod", "modinfo", "EnumDeviceDrivers", "WBEM\\WDM", "CurrentControlSet\\Services"]);
let ExcludedSystemProcesses = dynamic(["MsMpEng.exe", "SenseIR.exe", "MsSense.exe", "CSFalconService.exe"]);
// Process-based driver discovery
let ProcessBasedDiscovery = DeviceProcessEvents
| where TimeGenerated > ago(1d)
| where FileName in~ (DriverDiscoveryBinaries)
    or ProcessCommandLine has_any (DriverDiscoveryKeywords)
| where not (InitiatingProcessFileName in~ (ExcludedSystemProcesses))
| where not (InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "svchost.exe" and AccountName == "SYSTEM" and ProcessCommandLine !has "-fo")
| extend DetectionSource = "ProcessExecution"
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, FolderPath, DetectionSource;
// Registry-based driver discovery (HOPLIGHT pattern)
let RegistryBasedDiscovery = DeviceRegistryEvents
| where TimeGenerated > ago(1d)
| where RegistryKey has_any ("SOFTWARE\\WBEM\\WDM", "CurrentControlSet\\Services", "CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Class")
| where ActionType in ("RegistryValueQueried", "RegistryKeyQueried")
| where not (InitiatingProcessFileName in~ (ExcludedSystemProcesses))
| where not (InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("services.exe", "svchost.exe", "WmiPrvSE.exe") and AccountName == "SYSTEM")
| extend DetectionSource = "RegistryQuery"
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine = "", FileName = InitiatingProcessFileName, ProcessCommandLine = RegistryKey, FolderPath = RegistryKey, DetectionSource;
// Union results and score
ProcessBasedDiscovery
| union RegistryBasedDiscovery
| extend RiskScore = case(
    InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("powershell.exe", "cmd.exe", "wscript.exe", "cscript.exe", "mshta.exe") and AccountName != "SYSTEM", 80,
    InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("powershell.exe", "cmd.exe") and AccountName == "SYSTEM", 60,
    DetectionSource == "RegistryQuery" and InitiatingProcessFileName !in~ ("explorer.exe", "mmc.exe"), 70,
    true(), 40
  )
| sort by TimeGenerated desc

index=* sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1
| eval lower_image=lower(Image), lower_cmdline=lower(CommandLine)
| where match(lower_image, "(driverquery\.exe|lsmod|modinfo)") OR
    match(lower_cmdline, "(driverquery|lsmod|modinfo|enumdevicedrivers|wbem\\\\wdm|currentcontrolset\\\\services)")
| where NOT match(lower_image, "(msmpeng\.exe|mssense\.exe|csfalconservice\.exe|senseir\.exe)")
| where NOT (match(lower_image, "svchost\.exe") AND User="NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM" AND NOT match(lower_cmdline, "-fo"))
| eval risk_score=case(
    match(lower_image, "(powershell\.exe|cmd\.exe|wscript\.exe|cscript\.exe|mshta\.exe)") AND NOT match(User, "SYSTEM"), 80,
    match(lower_image, "(powershell\.exe|cmd\.exe)") AND match(User, "SYSTEM"), 60,
    match(lower_image, "driverquery\.exe") AND match(lower_image, "(cmd\.exe|powershell)"), 70,
    true(), 40
  )
| eval detection_context=case(
    match(lower_cmdline, "wbem\\\\wdm"), "HOPLIGHT Registry Pattern",
    match(lower_image, "driverquery\.exe"), "Native Driver Enumeration",
    match(lower_cmdline, "lsmod"), "Linux Kernel Module Discovery",
    match(lower_cmdline, "modinfo"), "Kernel Module Info Gathering",
    true(), "General Driver Discovery"
  )
| table _time, host, User, Image, CommandLine, ParentImage, ParentCommandLine, risk_score, detection_context
| sort -risk_score, -_time

process where event.type == "start" and (
  process.name in~ ("powershell.exe", "cmd.exe", "wscript.exe", "cscript.exe") or
  process.parent.name in~ ("cmd.exe", "powershell.exe", "wscript.exe")
) and (
  process.command_line : ("*t1652*", "*suspicious*") or
  process.args : ("*encoded*", "*bypass*", "*hidden*")
) and not process.code_signature.trusted == true

SELECT
    DATEFORMAT(devicetime, 'yyyy-MM-dd HH:mm:ss') AS EventTime,
    LOGSOURCENAME(logsourceid) AS LogSource,
    "username" AS AccountName,
    "CommandLine" AS CommandLine,
    "ParentProcessName" AS ParentProcess,
    "NewProcessName" AS ProcessName,
    CASE
        WHEN "CommandLine" ILIKE '%powershell%' AND "CommandLine" ILIKE '%-enc%' THEN 'EncodedCommand'
        WHEN "CommandLine" ILIKE '%bypass%' THEN 'ExecutionBypass'
        WHEN "CommandLine" ILIKE '%-noprofile%' THEN 'NoProfileExecution'
        ELSE 'SuspiciousProcess'
    END AS DetectionType,
    CASE
        WHEN "username" = 'SYSTEM' THEN 70
        WHEN "CommandLine" ILIKE '%bypass%' THEN 85
        ELSE 60
    END AS RiskScore
FROM events
WHERE
    LOGSOURCETYPENAME(devicetype) IN ('Microsoft Windows Security Event Log', 'Universal DSM')
    AND eventid IN (4688, 1)
    AND ("NewProcessName" ILIKE '%powershell.exe%'
        OR "NewProcessName" ILIKE '%cmd.exe%'
        OR "NewProcessName" ILIKE '%wscript.exe%'
        OR "NewProcessName" ILIKE '%cscript.exe%'
        OR "NewProcessName" ILIKE '%mshta.exe%')
    AND RiskScore >= 60
ORDER BY EventTime DESC
LAST 1 HOURS

_sourceCategory=windows/sysmon EventCode=1
| json auto
| where process_name in ("powershell.exe", "cmd.exe", "wscript.exe", "cscript.exe", "mshta.exe", "rundll32.exe")
| where process_cmdline matches /(-enc|-encodedcommand|-bypass|-hidden|invoke-expression|iex\s)/i
    OR process_cmdline matches /(http:\/\/|https:\/\/|ftp:\/\/)/i
| if(process_cmdline matches /-enc/i, "EncodedCommand",
    if(process_cmdline matches /-bypass/i, "BypassExecution",
    if(process_cmdline matches /(invoke-expression|iex)/i, "ScriptExecution",
    "SuspiciousProcess"))) as detection_type
| if(parent_process_name in ("w3wp.exe","httpd.exe","nginx.exe"), 95,
    if(process_cmdline matches /-enc/i, 85,
    if(process_cmdline matches /-bypass/i, 75, 60))) as risk_score
| where risk_score >= 60
| count by host, user, process_name, process_cmdline, parent_process_name, detection_type, risk_score
| sort - risk_score

rule detection_t1652 {
  meta:
    author = "Argus Detection Platform"
    description = "Detects Device Driver Discovery - T1652"
    severity = "HIGH"
    mitre_attack = "T1652"
    reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1652/"

  events:
    $e.metadata.event_type = "PROCESS_LAUNCH"
    $e.principal.hostname = $hostname
    $e.target.process.file.full_path = $process_path
    $e.target.process.command_line = $cmdline
    (
      re.regex($e.target.process.file.full_path, `(?i)(powershell|cmd|wscript|cscript|mshta|rundll32)\.exe$`) and
      (
        re.regex($e.target.process.command_line, `(?i)-enc(odedcommand)?`) or
        re.regex($e.target.process.command_line, `(?i)-bypass`) or
        re.regex($e.target.process.command_line, `(?i)(invoke-expression|iex\s)`) or
        re.regex($e.target.process.command_line, `(?i)http://`)
      )
    )
    not re.regex($e.principal.process.file.full_path, `(?i)(trustedinstaller|msiexec|svchost)`)

  condition:
    $e
}

#event_simpleName = "ProcessRollup2"
| ImageFileName = /(?i)(powershell|cmd|wscript|cscript|mshta|rundll32)\.exe$/
| CommandLine = /(?i)(-enc(odedcommand)?|-bypass|-noprofile|invoke-expression|iex\s|http:\/\/)/
| case {
    CommandLine = /(?i)-enc(odedcommand)?/ | DetectionType := "EncodedCommand" ;
    CommandLine = /(?i)-bypass/ | DetectionType := "BypassExecution" ;
    CommandLine = /(?i)(invoke-expression|iex\s)/ | DetectionType := "ScriptExecution" ;
    * | DetectionType := "SuspiciousProcess"
}
| case {
    ParentBaseFileName = /(?i)(w3wp|httpd|nginx|php-cgi)\.exe/ | RiskScore := "Critical" ;
    CommandLine = /(?i)-enc/ | RiskScore := "High" ;
    * | RiskScore := "Medium"
}
| table([ComputerName, UserName, ImageFileName, CommandLine, ParentBaseFileName, DetectionType, RiskScore, ProcessId, ParentProcessId])
| sort(RiskScore, order=desc, limit=100)