Social Media Accounts
Adversaries create and cultivate fake or impersonation social media accounts to build credible personas for use in targeting operations. These accounts may impersonate real employees, HR staff, recruiters, or industry contacts to establish trust before launching spearphishing, credential harvesting, or intelligence-gathering campaigns. Detection focuses on downstream observables: inbound social engineering emails referencing social media profiles, employees receiving suspicious connection or recruitment messages, and threat intelligence correlation identifying accounts impersonating your organization's staff. Real-world examples include HEXANE creating fake LinkedIn HR accounts offering jobs, CURIUM building networks of fictitious profiles posing as attractive contacts, Scattered Spider creating matching fake social media accounts to support identity theft, and EXOTIC LILY mimicking target company employees to gain trust before delivering malware.
let SocialMediaDomains = dynamic([
"linkedin.com", "facebook.com", "twitter.com", "x.com",
"instagram.com", "telegram.org", "t.me", "wa.me",
"discord.com", "discord.gg", "linktr.ee"
]);
let SocialEngineeringKeywords = dynamic([
"job opportunity", "career opportunity", "employment offer",
"found your profile", "connect with you", "exclusive opportunity",
"remote position", "we are hiring", "job opening", "open role",
"recruiter", "talent acquisition", "LinkedIn connection",
"exciting opportunity", "I came across your profile",
"work from home", "contractor position", "freelance project"
]);
let HighValueJobTitles = dynamic([
"CEO", "CFO", "CISO", "CTO", "COO", "VP", "Vice President",
"Director", "Manager", "Engineer", "Analyst", "Administrator",
"Developer", "Architect"
]);
// Step 1: Find inbound emails with social engineering subject lines
let SuspiciousEmails = EmailEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where EmailDirection == "Inbound"
| where DeliveryAction != "Blocked"
| where Subject has_any (SocialEngineeringKeywords)
| project Timestamp, NetworkMessageId, SenderFromAddress, SenderFromDomain,
RecipientEmailAddress, Subject, DeliveryLocation, DeliveryAction;
// Step 2: Join with URL info to find social media links in those emails
let EmailsWithSocialLinks = SuspiciousEmails
| join kind=inner (
EmailUrlInfo
| where Url has_any (SocialMediaDomains)
| project NetworkMessageId, SocialMediaUrl=Url, UrlDomain=UrlDomain
) on NetworkMessageId;
// Step 3: Enrich with recipient identity for high-value targeting detection
EmailsWithSocialLinks
| join kind=leftouter (
IdentityInfo
| where JobTitle has_any (HighValueJobTitles)
| project AccountUpn, TargetJobTitle=JobTitle, Department
) on $left.RecipientEmailAddress == $right.AccountUpn
| extend IsHighValueTarget = isnotempty(TargetJobTitle)
| extend ExternalSender = SenderFromDomain !endswith ".internal" and SenderFromDomain !in~ ("yourcompany.com")
| project Timestamp, NetworkMessageId, SenderFromAddress, SenderFromDomain,
RecipientEmailAddress, TargetJobTitle, Department, Subject,
SocialMediaUrl, UrlDomain, DeliveryLocation, IsHighValueTarget
| sort by IsHighValueTarget desc, Timestamp desc Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives
- Legitimate external recruiters using LinkedIn InMail or email to contact employees about real job opportunities
- HR teams running internal talent acquisition campaigns referencing social media profiles
- Marketing or PR staff receiving social media collaboration or partnership outreach
- Security awareness training simulations sending test phishing emails with social media themes
- Industry event organizers sending networking invitations with social media links
References (9)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585/001/
- https://www.securityweek.com/iranian-hackers-targeted-us-officials-elaborate-social-media-attack-operation
- http://media.blackhat.com/bh-us-10/whitepapers/Ryan/BlackHat-USA-2010-Ryan-Getting-In-Bed-With-Robin-Sage-v1.0.pdf
- https://blog.google/threat-analysis-group/exotic-lily-initial-access-broker/
- https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-320a
- https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2021/11/16/evolving-trends-in-iranian-threat-actor-activity/
- https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/medusa-ransomware/
- https://www.clearskysec.com/siamesekitten/
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1585.001/T1585.001.md
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