T1201

Password Policy Discovery

Adversaries may attempt to access detailed information about the password policy used within an enterprise network or cloud environment. Password policies enforce complexity requirements that make passwords harder to guess or crack through brute force. By discovering lockout thresholds, minimum length, and complexity rules, adversaries can tailor dictionary and brute force attacks to comply with the policy — maximizing credential testing while avoiding account lockout. Discovery occurs via command-line utilities (net accounts, Get-ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy, chage, pwpolicy), cloud APIs (AWS GetAccountPasswordPolicy), and network device CLIs. This technique is commonly observed in the early reconnaissance phase of intrusions by groups including OilRig, Turla, and Chimera.

Microsoft Sentinel / Defender

kusto

let PasswordPolicyCommands = dynamic([
  "net accounts",
  "net.exe accounts",
  "Get-ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy",
  "Get-ADFineGrainedPasswordPolicy",
  "Get-PassPol",
  "pwpolicy",
  "chage -l",
  "chage --list",
  "pam.d",
  "common-password",
  "pwquality",
  "show aaa",
  "NtdsAudit"
]);
let PasswordPolicyCmdlets = dynamic([
  "Get-ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy",
  "Get-ADFineGrainedPasswordPolicy",
  "Get-ADFineGrainedPasswordPolicySubject",
  "Get-PassPol"
]);
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where (
    // net accounts and net accounts /domain
    (FileName =~ "net.exe" or FileName =~ "net1.exe") and ProcessCommandLine has "accounts"
  ) or (
    // PowerShell AD password policy cmdlets
    (FileName =~ "powershell.exe" or FileName =~ "pwsh.exe") and
    ProcessCommandLine has_any (PasswordPolicyCmdlets)
  ) or (
    // CrackMapExec or other tools querying password policy via LDAP/WMI patterns
    ProcessCommandLine has_any ("NtdsAudit", "--pass-pol", "--password-policy")
  ) or (
    // Linux: chage command reading password aging info
    FileName =~ "chage" and (ProcessCommandLine has "-l" or ProcessCommandLine has "--list")
  ) or (
    // macOS: pwpolicy command
    FileName =~ "pwpolicy" and ProcessCommandLine has "getaccountpolicies"
  )
| extend DiscoveryMethod = case(
    ProcessCommandLine has "accounts /domain" or ProcessCommandLine has "accounts", "net accounts",
    ProcessCommandLine has_any ("Get-ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy", "Get-ADFineGrainedPasswordPolicy"), "PowerShell AD Cmdlet",
    ProcessCommandLine has "Get-PassPol", "PoshC2 Get-PassPol",
    ProcessCommandLine has "NtdsAudit", "NtdsAudit Utility",
    ProcessCommandLine has "chage", "Linux chage",
    ProcessCommandLine has "pwpolicy", "macOS pwpolicy",
    ProcessCommandLine has_any ("--pass-pol", "--password-policy"), "CrackMapExec-style",
    "Other"
  )
| extend IsDomainQuery = ProcessCommandLine has "/domain" or ProcessCommandLine has_any ("Get-ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy", "Get-ADFineGrainedPasswordPolicy")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, AccountDomain,
         FileName, ProcessCommandLine,
         InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine,
         DiscoveryMethod, IsDomainQuery
| sort by Timestamp desc

low severity high confidence

Data Sources

Process: Process Creation Command: Command Execution Microsoft Defender for Endpoint

Required Tables

DeviceProcessEvents

False Positives

IT administrators running 'net accounts /domain' for routine password policy audits or compliance checks
Security tools and vulnerability scanners (Nessus, Qualys, CIS-CAT) that enumerate password policy as part of baseline hardening assessments
Active Directory management scripts and monitoring agents (e.g., Azure AD Connect health, SIEM onboarding scripts) that periodically query domain password policy
Help desk staff using net accounts to verify lockout policy before resetting a locked account
Automated identity governance platforms (SailPoint, Saviynt) querying fine-grained password policies during access reviews

Splunk

spl

index=wineventlog (sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1) OR (sourcetype="WinEventLog:Security" EventCode=4688)
| eval CommandLine=coalesce(CommandLine, NewProcessName)
| eval CommandLineLower=lower(CommandLine)
| eval ImageLower=lower(coalesce(Image, NewProcessName))
| eval IsNetAccounts=if(
    (match(ImageLower, "(net\.exe|net1\.exe)$") AND match(CommandLineLower, "accounts")),
    1, 0)
| eval IsPSADPolicy=if(
    (match(ImageLower, "(powershell\.exe|pwsh\.exe)$") AND
     match(CommandLineLower, "(get-addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy|get-adfinegrainedpasswordpolicy|get-adfinegrainedpasswordpolicysubject|get-passpol)")),
    1, 0)
| eval IsNtdsAudit=if(match(CommandLineLower, "ntdsaudit"), 1, 0)
| eval IsCMEPassPol=if(match(CommandLineLower, "(--pass-pol|--password-policy)"), 1, 0)
| eval IsChage=if(match(ImageLower, "chage") AND match(CommandLineLower, "(-l|--list)"), 1, 0)
| eval IsPwPolicy=if(match(ImageLower, "pwpolicy") AND match(CommandLineLower, "getaccountpolicies"), 1, 0)
| eval IsDomainQuery=if(match(CommandLineLower, "(/domain|get-addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy|get-adfinegrainedpasswordpolicy)"), 1, 0)
| eval SuspicionScore=IsNetAccounts + IsPSADPolicy + IsNtdsAudit + IsCMEPassPol + IsChage + IsPwPolicy
| where SuspicionScore > 0
| eval DiscoveryMethod=case(
    IsNetAccounts=1 AND IsDomainQuery=1, "net accounts /domain",
    IsNetAccounts=1, "net accounts (local)",
    IsPSADPolicy=1 AND match(CommandLineLower, "get-passpol"), "PoshC2 Get-PassPol",
    IsPSADPolicy=1, "PowerShell AD Password Policy Cmdlet",
    IsNtdsAudit=1, "NtdsAudit Utility",
    IsCMEPassPol=1, "CrackMapExec-style",
    IsChage=1, "Linux chage",
    IsPwPolicy=1, "macOS pwpolicy",
    1=1, "Other")
| table _time, host, User, ImageLower, CommandLine, ParentImage, ParentCommandLine,
        DiscoveryMethod, IsDomainQuery, IsNetAccounts, IsPSADPolicy, IsNtdsAudit, IsCMEPassPol, SuspicionScore
| sort - _time

low severity high confidence

Data Sources

Process: Process Creation Command: Command Execution Sysmon Event ID 1 Windows Security Event ID 4688

Required Sourcetypes

XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational WinEventLog:Security

False Positives

IT administrators running 'net accounts /domain' for routine password policy audits or compliance checks
Security tools and vulnerability scanners (Nessus, Qualys, CIS-CAT) that enumerate password policy as part of baseline hardening assessments
Active Directory management scripts and monitoring agents that periodically query domain password policy
Help desk staff using net accounts to verify lockout policy before resetting a locked account
Automated identity governance platforms querying fine-grained password policies during access reviews

IBM QRadar (AQL)

sql

SELECT DATEFORMAT(starttime, 'YYYY-MM-dd HH:mm:ss') AS EventTime,
       sourceip, username, LOGSOURCENAME(logsourceid) AS LogSource,
       "Process Name", "Command",
       CASE
         WHEN LOWER("Command") LIKE '%accounts%' AND (LOWER("Process Name") LIKE '%net.exe' OR LOWER("Process Name") LIKE '%net1.exe') THEN 'net accounts'
         WHEN LOWER("Command") LIKE '%get-addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy%' THEN 'PowerShell AD Cmdlet'
         WHEN LOWER("Command") LIKE '%get-adfinegrainedpasswordpolicy%' THEN 'PowerShell AD Cmdlet'
         WHEN LOWER("Command") LIKE '%get-passpol%' THEN 'PoshC2 Get-PassPol'
         WHEN LOWER("Command") LIKE '%ntdsaudit%' THEN 'NtdsAudit Utility'
         WHEN LOWER("Command") LIKE '%-pass-pol%' OR LOWER("Command") LIKE '%--password-policy%' THEN 'CrackMapExec-style'
         WHEN LOWER("Process Name") LIKE '%chage%' AND (LOWER("Command") LIKE '% -l%' OR LOWER("Command") LIKE '%--list%') THEN 'Linux chage'
         WHEN LOWER("Process Name") LIKE '%pwpolicy%' AND LOWER("Command") LIKE '%getaccountpolicies%' THEN 'macOS pwpolicy'
         ELSE 'Other'
       END AS DiscoveryMethod
FROM events
WHERE LOGSOURCETYPEID IN (12, 13, 45, 143, 352)
  AND starttime > NOW() - 86400000
  AND (
    (LOWER("Process Name") LIKE '%net.exe' OR LOWER("Process Name") LIKE '%net1.exe') AND LOWER("Command") LIKE '%accounts%'
    OR (LOWER("Process Name") LIKE '%powershell.exe' OR LOWER("Process Name") LIKE '%pwsh.exe')
       AND (
         LOWER("Command") LIKE '%get-addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy%'
         OR LOWER("Command") LIKE '%get-adfinegrainedpasswordpolicy%'
         OR LOWER("Command") LIKE '%get-passpol%'
       )
    OR LOWER("Command") LIKE '%ntdsaudit%'
    OR LOWER("Command") LIKE '%-pass-pol%'
    OR LOWER("Command") LIKE '%--password-policy%'
    OR (LOWER("Process Name") LIKE '%chage%' AND (LOWER("Command") LIKE '% -l %' OR LOWER("Command") LIKE '%--list%'))
    OR (LOWER("Process Name") LIKE '%pwpolicy%' AND LOWER("Command") LIKE '%getaccountpolicies%')
  )
ORDER BY starttime DESC

medium severity medium confidence

Data Sources

Windows Security Events (4688) Sysmon Operational (Event ID 1) Linux auditd

Required Tables

events

False Positives

Domain administrators executing periodic password policy audits as part of change management workflows
Vulnerability management tools enumerating Active Directory configuration for compliance reporting
Help desk staff using net accounts to verify lockout thresholds when assisting users

Sumo Logic CSE

sql

_sourceCategory=windows/sysmon OR _sourceCategory=windows/security
| parse regex field=_raw "(?:Image|NewProcessName)[=>\s]+(?P<Image>[^\r\n<]+)" nodrop
| parse regex field=_raw "(?:CommandLine|ProcessCommandLine)[=>\s]+(?P<CommandLine>[^\r\n<]+)" nodrop
| parse regex field=_raw "(?:ParentImage|ParentProcessName)[=>\s]+(?P<ParentImage>[^\r\n<]+)" nodrop
| parse regex field=_raw "(?:User|SubjectUserName)[=>\s]+(?P<User>[^\r\n<]+)" nodrop
| where !éisEmpty(CommandLine)
| eval ImageLower = toLowerCase(Image)
| eval CmdLower = toLowerCase(CommandLine)
| eval IsNetAccounts = if(matches(ImageLower, ".*(net\.exe|net1\.exe)$") and matches(CmdLower, ".*accounts.*"), 1, 0)
| eval IsPSADPolicy = if(
    matches(ImageLower, ".*(powershell\.exe|pwsh\.exe)$") and (
      matches(CmdLower, ".*get-addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy.*") or
      matches(CmdLower, ".*get-adfinegrainedpasswordpolicy.*") or
      matches(CmdLower, ".*get-passpol.*")
    ), 1, 0)
| eval IsNtdsAudit = if(matches(CmdLower, ".*ntdsaudit.*"), 1, 0)
| eval IsCMEPassPol = if(matches(CmdLower, ".*(--pass-pol|--password-policy).*"), 1, 0)
| eval IsChage = if(matches(ImageLower, ".*chage.*") and (matches(CmdLower, ".*-l.*") or matches(CmdLower, ".*--list.*")), 1, 0)
| eval IsPwPolicy = if(matches(ImageLower, ".*pwpolicy.*") and matches(CmdLower, ".*getaccountpolicies.*"), 1, 0)
| eval SuspicionScore = IsNetAccounts + IsPSADPolicy + IsNtdsAudit + IsCMEPassPol + IsChage + IsPwPolicy
| where SuspicionScore > 0
| eval IsDomainQuery = if(matches(CmdLower, ".*/domain.*") or matches(CmdLower, ".*get-addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy.*") or matches(CmdLower, ".*get-adfinegrainedpasswordpolicy.*"), "true", "false")
| eval DiscoveryMethod = if(IsNetAccounts=1 and IsDomainQuery="true", "net accounts /domain",
    if(IsNetAccounts=1, "net accounts (local)",
    if(IsPSADPolicy=1 and matches(CmdLower, ".*get-passpol.*"), "PoshC2 Get-PassPol",
    if(IsPSADPolicy=1, "PowerShell AD Cmdlet",
    if(IsNtdsAudit=1, "NtdsAudit Utility",
    if(IsCMEPassPol=1, "CrackMapExec-style",
    if(IsChage=1, "Linux chage",
    if(IsPwPolicy=1, "macOS pwpolicy", "Other"))))))))
| fields _messageTime, _sourceHost, User, Image, CommandLine, ParentImage, DiscoveryMethod, IsDomainQuery, SuspicionScore
| sort by _messageTime desc

medium severity high confidence

Data Sources

Windows Sysmon (Event ID 1) Windows Security Event ID 4688 Linux auditd/syslog

Required Tables

_sourceCategory=windows/sysmon _sourceCategory=windows/security

False Positives

IT operations teams running automated AD health check scripts that enumerate password policies nightly
Security operations tools like BloodHound or Purple Knight legitimately querying AD password policy for assessment purposes
System administrators using 'net accounts' to verify GPO-enforced policy after configuration changes

Google Chronicle / SecOps

yaral

rule t1201_password_policy_discovery {
  meta:
    author = "Argus Detection Engineering"
    description = "Detects Password Policy Discovery (T1201) via process execution of net accounts, PowerShell AD cmdlets, chage, pwpolicy, NtdsAudit, or CrackMapExec password policy enumeration."
    mitre_attack_tactic = "Discovery"
    mitre_attack_technique = "T1201"
    severity = "MEDIUM"
    priority = "MEDIUM"

  events:
    $e.metadata.event_type = "PROCESS_LAUNCH"
    $e.principal.process.file.full_path != ""

    (
      // net.exe accounts or net1.exe accounts
      (re.regex($e.principal.process.file.full_path, `(?i)(net\.exe|net1\.exe)$`) and
       re.regex($e.principal.process.command_line, `(?i)accounts`))
      or
      // PowerShell AD password policy cmdlets
      (re.regex($e.principal.process.file.full_path, `(?i)(powershell\.exe|pwsh\.exe)$`) and
       re.regex($e.principal.process.command_line, `(?i)(Get-ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy|Get-ADFineGrainedPasswordPolicy|Get-ADFineGrainedPasswordPolicySubject|Get-PassPol)`))
      or
      // NtdsAudit utility
      re.regex($e.principal.process.command_line, `(?i)NtdsAudit`)
      or
      // CrackMapExec-style password policy flags
      re.regex($e.principal.process.command_line, `(?i)(--pass-pol|--password-policy)`)
      or
      // Linux chage -l / --list
      (re.regex($e.principal.process.file.full_path, `(?i)chage$`) and
       re.regex($e.principal.process.command_line, `(?i)(-l\b|--list)`))
      or
      // macOS pwpolicy getaccountpolicies
      (re.regex($e.principal.process.file.full_path, `(?i)pwpolicy$`) and
       re.regex($e.principal.process.command_line, `(?i)getaccountpolicies`))
    )

  condition:
    $e
}

medium severity high confidence

Data Sources

Google Chronicle UDM via Endpoint sensor Windows Sysmon forwarded to Chronicle Chronicle Unified Data Model PROCESS_LAUNCH events

Required Tables

UDM PROCESS_LAUNCH events

False Positives

Privileged IT staff running Get-ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy as part of regular Active Directory audits or compliance checks
Security assessment tools (e.g., PingCastle, BloodHound) querying AD password policy during authorized assessments
Linux system administrators using chage -l to review user account aging settings for compliance

CrowdStrike LogScale (CQL)

cql

#repo=base_sensor #event_simpleName=ProcessRollup2
| FileName = /(?i)(net\.exe|net1\.exe|powershell\.exe|pwsh\.exe|chage|pwpolicy)$/
| CommandLine = /(?i)(accounts|Get-ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy|Get-ADFineGrainedPasswordPolicy|Get-ADFineGrainedPasswordPolicySubject|Get-PassPol|NtdsAudit|--pass-pol|--password-policy|getaccountpolicies)/
| case {
    FileName = /(?i)(net\.exe|net1\.exe)/ AND CommandLine = /(?i)accounts/ | DiscoveryMethod := "net accounts" ;
    CommandLine = /(?i)Get-ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy/ | DiscoveryMethod := "PowerShell AD Cmdlet" ;
    CommandLine = /(?i)Get-ADFineGrainedPasswordPolicy/ | DiscoveryMethod := "PowerShell AD Fine-Grained Cmdlet" ;
    CommandLine = /(?i)Get-PassPol/ | DiscoveryMethod := "PoshC2 Get-PassPol" ;
    CommandLine = /(?i)NtdsAudit/ | DiscoveryMethod := "NtdsAudit Utility" ;
    CommandLine = /(?i)(--pass-pol|--password-policy)/ | DiscoveryMethod := "CrackMapExec-style" ;
    FileName = /(?i)chage/ AND CommandLine = /(?i)(-l\b|--list)/ | DiscoveryMethod := "Linux chage" ;
    FileName = /(?i)pwpolicy/ AND CommandLine = /(?i)getaccountpolicies/ | DiscoveryMethod := "macOS pwpolicy" ;
    * | DiscoveryMethod := "Other"
  }
| IsDomainQuery := if(CommandLine = /(?i)(/domain|Get-ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy|Get-ADFineGrainedPasswordPolicy)/, "true", "false")
| table([_timeutc, ComputerName, UserName, FileName, CommandLine, ParentBaseFileName, DiscoveryMethod, IsDomainQuery])
| sort(field=_timeutc, order=desc)

medium severity high confidence

Data Sources

CrowdStrike Falcon Endpoint sensor (ProcessRollup2 events) Falcon Data Replicator (FDR)

Required Tables

base_sensor ProcessRollup2

False Positives

IT administrators or help desk staff using 'net accounts' to verify lockout threshold settings after user lockout incidents
Automated compliance scanning tools running PowerShell AD cmdlets to export policy configuration for audit reports
Red team or penetration testing activity on systems designated for authorized security assessments

Last updated: 2026-04-19 Research depth: deep

References (13)

Response Playbook

1. Examine the full command line and decode any Base64 content...
2. Identify the parent process chain and user context...
3. Check for concurrent network connections from the process...

Investigation Guide

Related techniques: T1027, T1105, T1562.001...
Forensic artifacts: PSReadLine history, Prefetch, ScriptBlock logs...

Atomic Red Team Tests

Test 1: Encoded command execution...
Test 2: Download cradle via Net.WebClient...

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Password Policy Discovery

Data Sources

Required Tables

False Positives

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Required Sourcetypes

False Positives

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Data Sources

Required Tables

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Response Playbook

Investigation Guide

Atomic Red Team Tests

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