BeyondTrust Remote Support Pre-Auth RCE (CVE-2026-1731)
Detects exploitation of CVE-2026-1731, a pre-authentication remote code execution vulnerability (CWE-78, OS command injection) in BeyondTrust Remote Support and Privileged Remote Access. CVSS 9.8. Actively exploited in the wild (CISA KEV). Attackers can execute arbitrary OS commands without authentication via crafted HTTP requests to the appliance web interface.
Vulnerability Intelligence
KEV — Known ExploitedAffected Software
- Vendor
- BeyondTrust
- Product
- Remote Support, Privileged Remote Access
- Versions
- BeyondTrust Remote Support (see BT26-02), older Privileged Remote Access versions
Weakness (CWE)
Timeline
- Disclosed
- February 6, 2026
References & Proof of Concept
CVSS
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
What is CVE-2026-1731 BeyondTrust Remote Support Pre-Auth RCE (CVE-2026-1731)?
BeyondTrust Remote Support Pre-Auth RCE (CVE-2026-1731) (CVE-2026-1731) maps to the Initial Access and Execution and Lateral Movement tactics — the adversary is trying to get into your network in MITRE ATT&CK.
This page provides production-ready detection logic for BeyondTrust Remote Support Pre-Auth RCE (CVE-2026-1731), covering the data sources and telemetry it touches: Microsoft Defender for Endpoint, Microsoft Sentinel CEF/Syslog, IIS W3C Logs, CommonSecurityLog. The queries below are rated critical severity at high confidence, and ship for 7 SIEM platforms — KQL, SPL, Elastic, QRadar, Sumo, YARA-L, LogScale.
MITRE ATT&CK
let BeyondTrustPorts = dynamic([443, 80, 8080, 8443]);
let SuspiciousChildProcs = dynamic(["cmd.exe", "powershell.exe", "sh", "bash", "python", "python3", "wget", "curl", "nc", "ncat", "whoami", "id"]);
union isfuzzy=true
(
DeviceProcessEvents
| where InitiatingProcessParentFileName has_any ("bomgar", "beyondtrust", "remote_support", "pra", "rs_app")
| where FileName in~ (SuspiciousChildProcs)
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessParentFileName
| extend DetectionSource = "ProcessSpawn"
),
(
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where InitiatingProcessFileName has_any ("bomgar", "beyondtrust", "remote_support", "pra")
| where RemotePort !in (BeyondTrustPorts)
| where ActionType == "ConnectionSuccess"
| where RemoteIPType != "Private"
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, RemoteIP, RemotePort, RemoteUrl
| extend DetectionSource = "OutboundC2"
),
(
CommonSecurityLog
| where DeviceVendor == "BeyondTrust" or DeviceProduct has_any ("Remote Support", "Privileged Remote Access")
| where Activity has_any ("command", "exec", "shell", "os", "injection")
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, SourceIP, DestinationIP, Activity, AdditionalExtensions
| extend DetectionSource = "ApplianceLog"
),
(
W3CIISLog
| where csUriStem has_any ("/api/", "/login", "/appliance", "/cgi-bin")
| where csMethod == "POST"
| where scStatus in (200, 500, 503)
| where csUserAgent has_any ("python-requests", "curl", "Go-http-client", "exploit", "PoC")
| project TimeGenerated, sSiteName, csUriStem, csMethod, scStatus, csUserAgent, cIP
| extend DetectionSource = "WebLog"
)
| order by TimeGenerated desc Detects CVE-2026-1731 exploitation via suspicious child processes spawned by BeyondTrust appliance services, anomalous outbound connections from BeyondTrust processes, appliance log command injection indicators, and exploit-like HTTP user-agent strings targeting appliance endpoints.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives
- Legitimate BeyondTrust administrative scripts that spawn shell processes during maintenance
- Authorized penetration testing activity against the BeyondTrust appliance
- Security scanning tools with curl/python user-agents performing routine health checks
- BeyondTrust automated upgrade processes that temporarily spawn system binaries
Sigma rule & cross-platform mapping
The detection logic for BeyondTrust Remote Support Pre-Auth RCE (CVE-2026-1731) (CVE-2026-1731) above is provided in a vendor-neutral
form so you can deploy it on any SIEM. The same logic is shipped here as native
KQL (Microsoft Sentinel / Defender), SPL (Splunk), Elastic (Elastic Security (EQL)), QRadar (IBM QRadar (AQL)), Sumo (Sumo Logic CSE), YARA-L (Google Chronicle / SecOps), LogScale (CrowdStrike LogScale (CQL)) queries. In Sigma terms, this detection targets the
following logsource:
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows Browse the community-maintained Sigma rules for this technique:
Platform-specific guides for CVE-2026-1731
References (5)
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1CVE-2026-1731 PoC HTTP Request Simulation
Expected signal: IIS/nginx access log entry: POST /api/unauthenticated/session with user-agent 'CVE-2026-1731-PoC-Test' and POST body containing ';id;whoami;'. WAF should log or block the request.
- Test 2BeyondTrust Service Account Spawning Shell (Simulated Post-Exploitation)
Expected signal: Windows Security Event 4688: new process cmd.exe with parent process belonging to BeyondTrust service account (btrs_service). Process command line contains whoami, hostname, ipconfig, net user.
- Test 3BeyondTrust Process Outbound Reverse Shell Simulation
Expected signal: Linux auditd execve syscall: bash -i spawned by beyondtrust service process. Network connection record: beyondtrust process connecting outbound to LAB_ATTACKER_IP:4444 (non-standard port, external IP).
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