CVE-2024-26234

CVE-2024-26234 — Windows Proxy Driver Spoofing via Malicious Signed Driver

Detects exploitation of CVE-2024-26234, a Windows Proxy Driver Spoofing vulnerability where threat actors abuse Microsoft's WHQL signing process to load a malicious signed kernel driver. The driver installs a proxy component enabling persistent backdoor access. Severity is elevated given weaponized exploit status and kernel-level code execution potential.

Vulnerability Intelligence

Weaponized

Affected Software

Vendor
Microsoft
Product
Windows
Versions
Windows 10, Windows 11, Windows Server 2008-2022

Weakness (CWE)

Timeline

Disclosed
April 9, 2024
Patched
April 9, 2024

CVSS

6.7
Medium (4.0–6.9)

CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Write-up coming soon

What is CVE-2024-26234 CVE-2024-26234 — Windows Proxy Driver Spoofing via Malicious Signed Driver?

CVE-2024-26234 — Windows Proxy Driver Spoofing via Malicious Signed Driver (CVE-2024-26234) maps to the Persistence and Privilege Escalation and Defense Evasion tactics — the adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in MITRE ATT&CK.

This page provides production-ready detection logic for CVE-2024-26234 — Windows Proxy Driver Spoofing via Malicious Signed Driver, covering the data sources and telemetry it touches: Microsoft Defender for Endpoint, Microsoft Sentinel. The queries below are rated high severity at medium confidence, and ship for 7 SIEM platforms — KQL, SPL, Elastic, QRadar, Sumo, YARA-L, LogScale.

MITRE ATT&CK

Tactic
Persistence Privilege Escalation Defense Evasion
Microsoft Sentinel / Defender
kusto
let suspiciousDrivers = DeviceEvents
| where ActionType == "DriverLoad"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName !in~ ("System", "smss.exe", "services.exe")
| project DeviceId, Timestamp, FileName, FolderPath, SHA256, InitiatingProcessFileName;
let signedByMicrosoft = suspiciousDrivers
| join kind=leftouter (
    DeviceFileCertificateInfo
    | where Signer contains "Microsoft" or Signer contains "Windows"
    | project SHA256, Signer, SignerHash, IsTrusted
) on SHA256
| where IsTrusted == true;
signedByMicrosoft
| join kind=inner (
    DeviceNetworkEvents
    | where RemotePort in (80, 443, 1080, 8080, 8443)
    | where InitiatingProcessFileName endswith ".sys" or RemoteUrl contains "proxy"
    | project DeviceId, NetworkTimestamp=Timestamp, RemoteIP, RemoteUrl, RemotePort, InitiatingProcessFileName
) on DeviceId
| where abs(datetime_diff('minute', Timestamp, NetworkTimestamp)) < 30
| project Timestamp, DeviceId, DriverFile=FileName, FolderPath, SHA256, Signer, RemoteIP, RemoteUrl, RemotePort
| order by Timestamp desc

Correlates kernel driver loads signed by Microsoft with subsequent outbound proxy-like network connections from .sys processes, a key behavioral indicator of CVE-2024-26234 exploitation.

high severity medium confidence

Data Sources

Microsoft Defender for Endpoint Microsoft Sentinel

Required Tables

DeviceEvents DeviceFileCertificateInfo DeviceNetworkEvents

False Positives

  • Legitimate Microsoft-signed network filter drivers (e.g., WFP callout drivers) establishing management connections
  • VPN or network proxy software using signed kernel drivers for traffic interception
  • Security products with kernel drivers performing telemetry upload
  • Windows Update components loading signed drivers during patch cycles

Sigma rule & cross-platform mapping

The detection logic for CVE-2024-26234 — Windows Proxy Driver Spoofing via Malicious Signed Driver (CVE-2024-26234) above is provided in a vendor-neutral form so you can deploy it on any SIEM. The same logic is shipped here as native KQL (Microsoft Sentinel / Defender), SPL (Splunk), Elastic (Elastic Security (EQL)), QRadar (IBM QRadar (AQL)), Sumo (Sumo Logic CSE), YARA-L (Google Chronicle / SecOps), LogScale (CrowdStrike LogScale (CQL)) queries. In Sigma terms, this detection targets the following logsource:

logsource:
  category: network_connection
  product: windows

Browse the community-maintained Sigma rules for this technique:


Testing Methodology

Validate this detection against 4 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.

  1. Test 1Deploy a self-signed WHQL-mimicking kernel driver

    Expected signal: Windows Security Event ID 7045 (service install) with ServiceType=kernel, Sysmon Event ID 6 (driver load) with ImageLoaded path in ProgramData, and Code Integrity event in Microsoft-Windows-CodeIntegrity/Operational log.

  2. Test 2Simulate proxy connection from a .sys-named process

    Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 3 (network connection) with Image path ending in .sys, destination ports 1080 and 8080, and non-loopback destination IP.

  3. Test 3Extract and inspect driver certificate chain for WHQL abuse indicators

    Expected signal: Process creation event for sigcheck64.exe with command line referencing the driver path. Output file creation in C:\Temp\.

  4. Test 4Registry persistence check for kernel driver service entry

    Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 13 (registry value set) for HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\SimProxyDrv\ImagePath with a value pointing to a non-standard driver path, and Windows Security Event ID 4657 (registry value modified) if object access auditing is enabled.

Unlock Pro Content

Get the full detection package for CVE-2024-26234 including response playbook, investigation guide, and atomic red team tests.

Response PlaybookInvestigation GuideHunting QueriesAtomic Red Team TestsTuning Guidance

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